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Abstract—The stability and well-operation of a future elec-
tricity grid which includes numerous components of smart grid
technology is becoming much more dependent on the correct op-
eration of the supporting IT, and in this respect may become more
attractive to malicious attacks. To understand the vulnerabilities,
interdependencies between the electrical distribution grid and
IT components as well as critical infrastructures such as water
supply and health care will be simulated and evaluated. Aim of
the research activity is to develop a holistic analysis framework
to quantify and evaluate requirements and design decisions of the
many players in such complex infrastructures. Planning methods
and tools will be introduced that provide guidance at the design-
time of smart grid infrastructures, allowing for a high level of
security even under unfavorable conditions.
This paper presents the framework focusing on the methods
envisaged and an application scenario dealing with potential
threats to and impact of a large-scale and longer-lasting power
outage.
DISCLAIMER
This paper was accepted and presented at the Critical Infras-
tructure Protection and Resilience Europe (CIPRE) conference
in March 2015. It was never officially published by the
organizers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Critical Infrastructures (CIs) are facilities and organizations,
which ensure essential services and goods. A disruption of a CI
may have severe impacts for society, economy, and industry.
Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) covers all activities that
ensure a continued supply of vital services and products for
the population. This includes all coping measures to mitigate
and to minimize the consequences of CI disruptions before and
during disasters as well as to recover from the effects back to
satisfying living conditions.
Most critical are disruptions in information technology (e.g.
STUXNET [Geekheim, 2010]) and power blackouts (e.g.
Münsterland 2005 [Menski and Gardemann, 2008], USA
2012 [Mühr et al., 2012]) as they can easily affect further
critical infrastructures.
In 2012, the German Helmholtz research organization initi-
ated a research line on security. Three large Helmholtz centers,
the German aeronautics and space research centre (DLR), the
Research Center Jülich (FZJ) and the Karlsruhe Institute of
Technology (KIT), formed a consortium, combining their vast
knowledge in cyber security, sensors and platforms, emergency
management and security of critical infrastructures in one
project. The central activity so far focuses on CI. In particular,
the project aims at establishing a platform that serves as
focal point related to CIP activities for CI owners, operators,
local emergency management organizations and research. To
demonstrate the developed methodologies, a common scenario
was defined that allows combining the experience of the
three research centers and demonstrating the benefit of the
simulation approaches selected. This scenario focuses on a
malicious attack on the ICT components of a future power grid
in 2030, investigating the consequences and possible measures
to mitigate or prevent a longer lasting power blackout.
This paper is organized as follows. First the methodological
approaches applied will be presented, followed by a used case.
In further sections, preliminary results of the use case will
be discussed and first conclusions as well as future research
activities will be highlighted.
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
As described above, modern societies increasingly depend
on critical infrastructures (CIs), which are characterised by an
increasing interdependency between the different CI sectors
as well as between CIs and further socioeconomic systems
[Wang et al., 2012], [Rinaldi et al., 2001]. The evolution of
CIs and their interconnectedness imply that understanding
and predicting the consequences of disruptions has become
extremely difficult. The impact of any triggering event causing
CI disruptions has two components. The direct impact on the
CI itself, and the indirect impacts that propagate through the
network. To understand the importance of CIs and the far-
reaching consequences of their failure, modelling individual
CIs is not sufficient any longer [Comes et al., 2013]. Thus,
the need arises for integrated approaches.
Focusing on the CI sectors energy supply, ICT, health care
and water supply, the developed integrated approach includes a
critical infrastructure model (for health care and water supply),
a power flow optimization model, an ICT grid model as well as
an ICT security assessment model (see Figure 1). The ultimate
target of our approach is the provision of decision support
for designing resilient CIs. As a major input to reach this
target, the focus in this paper is the analysis of consequences of
CI disruptions (focus on electricity outages through malicious
attacks) as a basis for evaluating measures to increase the CI’s
resilience.
Figure 1 illustrates the connections and interfaces between
the individual submodels. Based on cost functions for lost
electrical load (provided by the critical infrastructure model,
Fig. 1. Model Interaction
see Section II-A) and a static evaluation of the ICT grid (see
Section II-B), the power flow optimization model conducts a
static optimization of the power grid in each time step (see
Section II-C). As an important input for the evaluation of the
ICT grid, the ICT security assessment model provides an anal-
ysis of the security objectives depending on the power status of
the individual ICT components. The dynamic characteristics of
CIs over time are mainly reflected by changing cost functions
for increasing outage or shortage durations.
A. Critical Infrastructure Modelling: Example with Water and
Health Care
To describe complex interdependencies of CIs, different
simulation approaches exist and one of them is the multi agent
based approach. It allows to introduce distributed problem
solving and considers trade-offs between the interests of all
parties involved (e.g. [Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008]).
All parties of interest, e.g. various critical infrastructures,
population, crisis management organizations, resources can
be represented by one or more individual agents. Any
agent interacts with others and the relevant environment.
This interaction is based on a set of rules, which represent
the interaction in reality. In this way, CI components are
represented by individual agents which can interact with
each other and also negotiate about resources needed.
However, the CI model contains, besides the simulation
part, also a data model. The data model contains the
properties and attributes of the CIs and describes the
relations between them. The Simulation tool comprises
the behaviors and the decisions of CIs’ elements. As we
decided to use the agent based modelling (ABM), the
next step was to select a suitable simulation environment.
There exist several simulation frameworks that can be used
to set up agent based simulations. For example NetLogo
[Tisue and Wilensky, 2004], Power TAC [Ketter et al., 2013],
AnyLogic [Borshchev and Filippov, 2004] and REPAST
[Collier et al., 2003] are representatives of commonly used
simulation environments. In this project the REPAST platform
is used as it is open source, has a strong user community and
can be easily combined with GIS systems and other external
tools. As a starting point, agents are defined for the health
care system (e.g. hospitals, elderly care and pharmacies)
and water supply. In a second step, households, emergency
management organizations with their crisis teams and first
responders will be also set up. Key parameters representing
a CI are the resources needed for operation and this defines
to some extent the decencies and the self-help capabilities of
each individual CI realization. Furthermore, the power and
water consumption of hospitals have been analyzed and the
appropriated functions derived. They will be recalculated at
each iteration step during the simulation. In order to consider
the practical applicability of our approach, agents are
equipped with real data. The data search refers preliminary to
health care facilities, water supply facilities and households.
Of interest are characteristics of these facilities for example in
the area of hospitals the number of beds, operation theatres,
patients or water consumption, etc. It also includes coping
capacities such as the number and performance of emergency
generators or food stocks. Furthermore it is important to
collect all relevant measures for these agents, which they can
use to mitigate consequences of the blackout. To estimate
the resilience in case of a longer lasting power blackout, the
emergency power supply capacity is important. For hospitals
this is typically 24 hours in Germany. This duration may
differ for other CIs. To allow the agents negotiating about
the energy needed, a cost function is under development
which comprises all relevant attributes such as the energy
consumption, importance for the society, importance for
other CIs and others. The cost function is of exponential
nature with a gentle slope as long as self-help capabilities
exist and with a steep slope when the functionality is no
longer guaranteed. This allows negotiating how to distribute
remaining resources between all parties involved, including
the normal household.
B. ICT Grid Model
The resilience of the future power grids ICT (information
and communications technology) infrastructure is an emerging
field of research. Some related work deals with the assessment
of the interplay between the IT and physical aspects. In 2010
Kundur et al. present an approach which expresses the IT
and electrical aspects as two graphs which are interconnected
[Kundur et al., 2010]. However, their approach is very de-
tailed and targets at modelling the internals systems, while
our approach aims at expressing the topologies of whole
cities. In 2014, Menasch et al. present an approach, which
aims to predict the impact of natural disasters and assess
the effect of countermeasures like undergrounding of power
lines or tree pruning [Menasché et al., 2014]. However, IT and
communication is not in the focus of their approach. Thus,
cyber-security is not covered. In 2011, Lin et al. coupled
a power system dynamics simulation with an event-based
network communication simulation. However, their approach
focusses on detailed communications and does not explicitly
consider cyber-threads [Lin et al., 2011]. The ICT grid model
assesses the consequences such threats can have on the ICT
infrastructure of the future power grid. As input, this analysis
gets data specifying the topology of the ICT infrastructure, as
well as a scenario specification. Within the scenario specifica-
tion, it is defined which points are still supplied by power
as well as which elements are corrupted or damaged. The
scenario specification either can be created manually or is
computed by the power flow model and an (cyber) attacker
simulation. As output, the ICT grid model determines which
systems are still able to perform demand side management and
which elements are still able to communicate with each other.
This output can in turn be used as input for the power flow
model and attacker simulations. The intended use of the ICT
grid model is within the design time of the power grid’s ICT
infrastructure. The goal is to fulfil the engineering mantra:
assess the properties of a system early, as well as identify
critical points in the system and fix problems as soon as
possible. The topology of the power grid’s ICT infrastructure
is captured within a graph. The vertices of the graph represent
either IT components (e.g., smart meters, controllers within
small power plants, SCADA servers) or network nodes (e.g.,
routers, switches, multiplexers). There are two kinds of edges.
Edges that represent physical communication connections as
well as optional edges that restrict logical communication.
Further, the vertices can be connected to multiple power supply
spots. These power supply spots are the incoming interface
from the power flow model. Based on the input scenario,
which specifies which power supply spots can be powered as
well as which nodes are defect, clusters of IT components
are determined which are still physically connected. If the
logical communication is constrained, the logical clusters are
identified within the physical clusters. The determination of
clusters is done using a modified version of Tarjan’s algorithm
[Tarjan, 1972]. Depending on the communication paradigm
which should be investigated and if there is a supervisory com-
ponent within the cluster, the smart meters can exert demand
side management of differing effectiveness. This information
serves in turn as input for the power flow model. Within the
ICT grid model, varying types of cyber-attacks can be simu-
lated. These may or may not be restricted by information from
the ICT security model. As input, these attacker simulations
get information specifying the communication clusters from
the ICT grid model. The attacker simulation tracks information
of the corruption states of the IT components in the ICT
infrastructure. This information can be used by the power
flow model to determine the grids remaining demand side
management capabilities, as well as margins of malevolent
manipulations. E.g., a bot net of controllers simultaneously
turning consumption or production to a maximum. Examples
of attacker simulations are virus propagation and local hacker.
Both are specified by a spread rate. In each time step, each
node corrupted by a virus can corrupt as many new as
specified by the spread rate. Viruses can still spread within
their communication cluster, even if they are severed from
their source by the outage of a communication line. A hacker
on the other hand has a fixed point of access within the ICT
infrastructure. Per time step, he is able to corrupt node within
his reach in the amount of the spread rate. If corrupted nodes
are severed from the hacker by communication outages, he
loses control over these nodes.
C. Power Flow Optimization Model
Prospectively, the introduction of smart grid techniques in
electrical grids will increase control possibilities for system
operators on the one hand, but also lead to a significant
increase of complexity in the lower voltage levels. In order
to incorporate power supply into the combined approach and
to simulate interdependencies of the electrical grid at the
distribution grid level and other CIs, a nonlinear model for
the alternate current Optimal Power Flow (OPF) problem
using IPOPT [Wächter and Biegler, 2006] is formulated as
described in [Torres and Quintana, 1998]. OPF models are
widely used in electrical engineering with a widely diversified
field of applications [Momoh et al., 1999]. The generalised




xmin ≤ x ≤ xmax
(1)
The equality constraints of the problem are given by the
power balance equations on every node of the system whereas
the inequality equations are given set by voltage limits and
maximum current flows on transmission lines and cables.
During each timestep t, information from the CI model and the
ICT grid model are used for the generation of the electricity
network state. Whereas most OPF models focus on minimiza-
tion of generation cost in a system without malfunctions, in
this approach the optimal supply of critical infrastructures re-
quires a goal function which minimizes cost of load shedding.
In order to optimise utilisation of the system consisting of
the i CIs simulated by the approach described in the above
subsection, the target function of the problem is formulated as
the minimisation of occurring cost for lost load Pi,t at every




ci,t ∗ Pi,t (2)
III. USE CASE
A. Scenario Description
In the considered scenario, we assume a future based on
the German Renewable Energy Act (German: Erneuerbare-
Energien-Gesetz, EEG), according to which the share of
electricity generation from renewable energy sources (RES) in
the overall generation shall amount to 50% until the year 2030.
The expansion of RES is accompanied by a decentralization
of the energy system. In order to efficiently maintain today’s
security of supply in the course of the expansion of fluctuating
RES, we assume that the power grid is not only restructured
and strengthened by conventional grid technologies but also
by smart grid technologies providing the basis for an energy
information and control network with distributed system intel-
ligence. As consumers also become producers, a decentralized
way of control is needed. Through smart meters (that have the
ability to regulate producing or consuming devices) or similar
controllers, demand side management is enabled. When as-
sessing the stability of the power supply of the CIs, the ICT
is an important aspect. In our future scenario, ICT becomes
ubiquitous within the power grid [Beckert et al., 2011]. But
not only the energy system, also other (critical) infrastruc-
tures are assumed to heavily depend on ICT. In particular,
software will control essential components of the physical
infrastructures as well as the communication between these
and their maintenance. Since modern societies depend on the
functioning performance of the physical infrastructures and the
services provided through these, a safe and secure operation
of the ICT system becomes more and more vital while, at
the same time, the risk exposure, e.g. to malicious attacks,
increases with the rising ICT penetration.
Fig. 2. Scenario Levels
In order to provide a platform on which to demonstrate the
developed methodology within the scenario described above,
we construct a hypothetical city with its own topography,
urbanisation, critical infrastructures and economy. We chose
to use a hypothetical region so that there are no security
or data access issues. We shall ensure that natural hazards,
such as earthquakes, floods or windstorms on a broad range
of intensity levels, duration, and spatial extent, are plausible
within the region and that it reflects the characteristics of
a real site in Germany. However, the major risk we focus
on within the use case in this paper is that of a malicious
attack to the ICT components within the decentralised energy
system (e.g. smart meters and controllers). The major question
in the considered use case is whether the malicious attack
infects the ICT components and under which circumstances
such infections my lead to a power outage. Besides this con-
sequence analysis itself, our goal is the evaluation of different
measures to prevent a power outage. The city’s simulated
levels of data acquisition are shown in Figure 2. The simulated
area includes approximately 180,000 households with about
300,000 inhabitants, connected to the low voltage electricity
grid, and about 2,000 transformer substations connecting the
low voltage grids to the medium voltage level. For the health-
care and water supply CI, 138 relevant elements have been
identified and data have been collected. This comprises mainly
the size, the number of patients, number of surgeries, power
consumption, self-help capabilities and production capacities
(for water works).
B. Selected Results
So far the simulation models described above are under
development and interfaces are defined but not realized. In
this respect, no results of coupled simulation are available at
the time of writing this paper. However, first assessments can
be reported.
Having set up the 138 elements of the two CI structures
healthcare and water supply, we have performed simulations
for selected power blackout scenarios. Figure 3 shows the
time dependent status of seven main hospitals assuming a
power blackout for 24 hours. This demonstrated on the one
hand site that a collapse of the CI is not immediate and
allows to identify those elements which requires support in the
first hours. The low number of hospitals on EPU (emergency
power generators) is the result of the assumption that diesel
is available only for some hours and that due to the power
blackout no further diesel can be obtained gasoline stations
do not have an EPU. These simulations are valuable for
planning purposes, on the basis of which the emergency
management organizations can set up contingency plans for
the most important power blackout scenarios.
Fig. 3. Time dependent status of hospitals (EPU = emergency power
generators), red means the number of hospitals without power, blue without
water and yellow number of hospitals where the emergency power is on
To simulate potential countermeasures a first version of a
cost function has been defined. Figure 4 shows an example
for one CI element. Depending on the nature of the CI and its
associated parameters defined in Section II-A, the cost function
will vary. This allows the power gird module to set priorities
in providing energy if still available to those CIs with the
highest cost functions.
Fig. 4. Example cost function for one selected hospital with self-help
capabilities for the first two time steps
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
Individual simulation models and approaches for critical
infrastructures, ICT and power flow have been developed
and customized to the simulated city. Data collection for the
simulation models is critical and partly difficult to realize.
However, dealing with the power grid of 2030 allows for some
flexibility in defining particular parameters. This also allows
performing parameter variations in the simulation to identify
components or approaches which are not at all suitable in
such a future grid. The next step will be the coupling of the
individual simulation models as indicated in Figure 1. For this
purpose, the time-dependent cost function resulting from the
water and health care model will be connected to the grid and
ICT model. The integrated simulation approach will allow an
estimation of the optimized electricity supply of these critical
infrastructures in case of emergency situations. Interfaces
between the modelling approaches, which connect the system’s
components based on geographical areas of electricity grid
substations, have been defined and realization has started. In
a second step, sensible countermeasures have to be defined
which will become part of the simulation models. For the
CI, a workshop has been conducted in 2014 with emergency
managers of local communities from southern Germany. As a
result, 12 management options were defined for water supply,
ranging from the use of additional power generators up to
use of tanks and construction of new pipelines. For hospitals,
only 8 measures were identified including the use of mobile
surgery components from outside up to a complete evacuation
of all patients. To decide between such measures, specific
agents will be developed and equipped with additional nego-
tiation facilities such as Multi Criteria Decision Making (e.g.
[Belton and Stewart, 2002]) or knowledge data bases with
case based reasoning approaches to learn from historic events
(e.g. [Aamodt and Plaza, 1994]). This will allow testing attack
scenarios with potential countermeasures to define those which
can be applied by the emergency management organizations
under the constraint of cost, manpower and resources.
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[Mühr et al., 2012] Mühr, B., Kunz, M., Khazai, B., Kunz-Plapp, T., Comes,
T., Vannieuwenhuyse, M., Schröter, K., Elmer, F., Leyser, A., and Zschau,
J. (2012). CEDIM FDA - report no. 1 on hurricane sandy. CEDIM
Research Reports Series.
[Rinaldi et al., 2001] Rinaldi, S. M., Peerenboom, J. P., and Kelly, T. K.
(2001). Identifying, understanding, and analyzing critical infrastructure
interdependencies. Control Systems, IEEE, 21(6):11–25.
[Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008] Shoham, Y. and Leyton-Brown, K.
(2008). Multiagent systems: Algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical
foundations. Cambridge University Press.
[Tarjan, 1972] Tarjan, R. (1972). Depth-first search and linear graph algo-
rithms. SIAM journal on computing, 1(2):146–160.
[Tisue and Wilensky, 2004] Tisue, S. and Wilensky, U. (2004). Netlogo: A
simple environment for modeling complexity. In International conference
on complex systems, volume 21. Boston, MA.
[Torres and Quintana, 1998] Torres, G. L. and Quintana, V. H. (1998). An
interior-point method for nonlinear optimal power flow using voltage rect-
angular coordinates. Power Systems, IEEE Transactions on, 13(4):1211–
1218.
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